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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. OSCAR MALDONADO
GRANADOS. Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnesses and Questions.-Where the district attorney in a murder case asked
decedent's brother whether decedent, 111 the course of a conversation with the brother, made any complaint to him, to
which he answered, "Yes," whereupon the court said, "Just a
moment please, objection sustained, answer stricken," defendant was not prejudiced in view of the court's prompt ruling
in sustaining an objection to the question and striking the
answer.
[2] !d.-Evidence-Accusatory Statements: Homicide-Evidence
-State of Mind-Threats.-Evidence by decedent's mother in
a murder case that in a conversation with defendant nearly
three years prior to the offense she told him that the next
time he bothered her daughter she would go to the police, to
which he replied that the police would have to have more
brains than he because if they left him alive he would kill the
mother and her two children, was admissible as constituting
an accusatory statement, as tending to establish prior threats
of defendant toward decedent, and to show motive and defendant's state of mind; an objection to the remoteness of
such evidence went to its weight rather than to its admissibility.
[3] Id.- Appeal- Objections- Argument of CounseL-Alleged
prejudicial error of the district attorney in a murder case
in stating in his opening statement that decedent's brother
would testify that about a year prior to the offense defendant
sent him out to buy a paper and that when he returned his
sister made an immediate complaint of a sexual proposition
defendant had made to her was without merit where no objection was made to the statement.
[4] Id.- Argument of Counsel- Opening Statements.-Opening
statements of a prosecuting attorney are supposed to be an
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 400 et seq., Homicide,
§§ 28, 199.
[4] See Am.Jur., Trial, § 454 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1371; [2] Criminal
Law, § 453 (1); Homicide, §§58, 67; [3] Criminal Law, § 1092;
[4] Criminal Law, § 598; [5] Criminal Law, § 619(2); (6] Homicide, § 229; [7) Criminal Law, § 875; [8] Criminal Law, §§ 900,
909(2); [9] Homicide,§ 145.
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outline of what the People intend to prove, and failure to do
so, whether on account of rules of evidence or otherwise, does
not necessarily indicate prejudice.
!d.-Argument of Counsel-Scope-Inferences.-Alleged error
of the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury in a
murder case that he would like to examine some of the evidence
in terms of the theory that defendant killed a 13-year-old
girl in the course of committing or attempting to commit "a
288 on her" was without merit where an objection to the
unreasonableness of the inference being drawn from the evidence was overruled and the court properly held that whether
the inference made by the arguer was reasonable was a question for the jury to decide.
Homicide-Instructions-Evidence-Reasonable Doubt.-In a
prosecution for murder of a 13-year-old girl, it was error to
refuse an instruction that if the jurors had a reasonable doubt
that defendant committed a violation of Pen. Code, § 288, or
attempted violation of such section, they could not return a
verdict of guilty of first degree murder on the theory that there
was an unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
violation of the code section, since the instruction accurately
stated the law and pinpointed the theory of the defense.
Criminal Law -Instructions- Degree of Proof-Reasonable
Doubt.-Though Pen. Code, § 1096a, declares that when the
statutory definition of reasonable doubt is given (Pen. Code,
§ 1096) no other instruction need be given defining reasonable
doubt, a defendant, on proper request therefor, has a right to
an instruction that directs attention to evidence from a consideration of which a reasonable doubt of his guilt could be
engendered.
!d.-Instructions-Duties of Jurors.-An instruction in a murder case that the discretion of jurors in considering the effect
of evidence as proof is not absolute and that it is their duty
to avoid fanciful theories and unreasonable inferences and not
to resort to imagination or suspicion was properly refused
where the court, among other things. instructed the jurors
that it was their duty to try the issues of fact presented by
the allegations in the information and defendant's plea of not
guilty, that they should perform this duty uninfluenced by
passion or prejudice against defendant, that neither the faet
that defendant had been arrested nor the fact that an information had been filed against him nor the fact that he had been
brought before the court to stand trial was evidence of his
guilt, and that they were not permitted to infer or to speculate
from any or all of such facts that defendant was more likely
to be guilty than innocent.
·

apron she was wearin:;;
parts, hut that the skirt she waP
above them. the murder was murder
and a conviction of first
murder

taken under Pen Code, § 1239)
Court of Los Angeles County.
Modified with directions.
Prosecution for murder of a
girL Judgment of
murder modified and cause r0manded
conviction of first
with directions to enter
finding defendant guilty
of second degree murder.
Joseph M. Rosen for
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney GeneraL and Norman H. Sokolow, Deputy Attorney
for Respondent.
McCOMB, J .-This is an automatic appeal from a judgment pronouncing defendant guilty of murder in the first
degt•ee after trial before a
On October 1, 1956, defendant and Mrs. Minjarez were
living as husband and wife. with her two children, Elvira
(age 13) and Raul
14), at 316 N. Garey Street, Los
Angeles. The four of them had been living as a family group
approximately four or five years prior to such date.
On the morning of October 1, 1956. defendant told Raul
and Elvira that he was
to take them to school to enrolL
Mrs.
bad
gone to work He drove the
children to a filling station across the street from the school,
where he left them for 15 or 20 minutes. Upon his return he
:mid the
at the school stated that Raul and Elvira
eould not go to the same schooL He further said he would
discuss it with Mrs.
and
would go to school
the next day.
He then drove to a. real estate office to discuss the rental
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his mother
money.
When Rani returned
vi'ith the
his mother had
given
he saw defendant at the r·ear
the house. As
out, and told
he started to enter, defendant
him to get some alcohol because his sister was fainting. Raul
observed that there was blood on one of defendant's hands
The other hand was behind his back.
Raul went to the front house and looked for some alcohol
but found none. Defendant then said they should go to the
doctor and get an ambulance. At this time Raul noticed that
defendant's hand had been washed and that it smelled like
soap.
Defendant and Raul then got into an automobile and proin front of a drug
ceeded toward Whittier. They
store, and defendant gave Raul 50 cents, telling him to buy
some alcohol, and said that he would drive around the block
and pick him up. Defendant never returned to the place
where he had left Raul.
Shortly after leaving Raul, defendant telephoned Mrs. Minjarez and told her that her daughter had poisoned herself.
Mrs. Minjarez immediately went to tlw premises at 316 N.
Garey, but could not find her daughter. She then went for a
Mr. Torres, who returned with her. They observed Officer
Towles near the house and told him of their mission. The
officer told Mr. Torres to look around outside the house and
also in the rear house.
Mr. Torres went inside the rear house and found Elvira's
body in the bedroom lying on the floor. Her skirt was up
above her private parts, and an apron over her dress was
pulled down below them. Bare skin showed in the area of the
hips, at the side of the apron, and above it was a wad of
clothing, which was the skirt.
There were blood stains on the wall, floor and decedent's
head. In a corner of the living room behind a small gas
h.eater was a machete covered with fresh blood.
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Defendant testified that when he was about 9 or 10 years
old he was in an accident in which a truck ran over him.
causing head injuries, as a result of which he would go temporarily blind and have very severe head pains; also that
occasionally he would ''go haywire.'' During such spells he
would have no recollection of his actions.
He testified further that after lunch on October 1, 1956, he
drank a can of beer; that Elvira was helping him clean the
inside of the rear house; that the doors were open; and that
during the course of the cleaning he asked Elvira if she was a
virgin, to which she replied that it was none of his business.
He said that she had never answered him like that before
and he struck her on the face with his hand, but did not
recall striking her with the machete; that he ''just went haywire"; that he did not know what he was doing after that
time; and that the next thing he remembered he was going
out of the rear house. He also said that he saw Raul and told
him something was wrong with Elvira and they were going to
get a doctor; that he dropped Raul at a drug store; and that
the next thing he remembered he was driving his automobile
but he did not know where he was going.
Defendant was arrested in El Paso, Texas, and was returned
to Los Angeles by the authorities.
[1] Defendant contends: First: The trial court committed

prejudicial error in the admission of the following e.vidence:
(a) During the examination of decedent's brother, Raul,
the district attorney asked him: "Now in the course of the
conversation [between decedent and Raul] did she make any
complaint to you-would you answer that yes or noT" to
which Raul answered, "Yes," whereupon the court said, "Just
a moment, objection sustained, answer stricken."
Clearly, in view of the court's prompt ruling in sustaining
an objection to the question and striking the answer, defendant was not prejudiced.
[2] (b) Decedent's mother was permitted to testify relative to a conversation she had with defendant in September
1953 to the effect that she told defendant that the next time
he bothered her daughter she would go to the police and he
replied that the police would have to have more brains than
he because if they left him alive he would kill Mrs. Minjarez
and her two children.
Such evidence was admissible as constituting an accusatory
statement, in that defendant was accused of molesting the
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child and told to stop, to which accusation he made no denial
but instead threatened to kill; and the court properly overruled an objection to the testimony on this ground.
Such evidence was also admissible on the ground that it
tended to establish prior threats of defendant toward decedent
and was competent to show motive and the state of mind of
defendant. The objection to the remoteness of such evidence
goes to its weight rather than to its admissibility. (People v.
Dement, 48 Cal.2d 600, 60,i [4] [311 P.2d 505]; People v.
De Moss, 4 Cal.2d 469, 474 [4] [50 P.2d 1031]; People v.
Flemming, 218 Cal. 300, 309 [3] [23 P.2d 28].)
[3, 4] Second: The district attorney committed prejudicial
error:
(a) In his opening statement wherein he said Raul would
testify that about a year prior to October 1, 1956, defendant
sent him out to buy a paper when his mother was not home
and that when Raul returned his sister made an immediate
complaint of a sexual proposition defendant had made to her.
This contention is devoid of merit for these reasons: (1) No
objection was made to the statement, and (2) opening statements are supposed to be an outline of what the People
intend to prove, and failure to do so, whether on account of
rules of evidence or otherwise, does not necessarily indicate
prejudice. (People v. Planagan, 65 Cal.App.2d 371, 407
[6] [150 P.2d 927].)
[5] (b) In his argument to the jury when he said he would
like to examine some of the evidence in terms of the theory
that defendant killed Elvira in the course of committing or
attempting to commit "a 288 on her."
This alleged error is also without merit. Defendant objected on the ground that the inference the deputy district
attorney was drawing from the evidence was unreasonable.
The objection was overruled by the court, who properly held
that whether the inference made by the arguer was reasonable
or not was a question for the jury to decide.
[6] Third: The trial court committed prejudicial error
in not giving requested instruct1:ons:
(a) That if the jurors had a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed a violation of section 288 of the Penal
Code or attempted violation of said section on the date of
October 1, 1956, then they could not return a verdict of guilty
of first degree murder based upon the theory that there was
an unlawful killing of a human being with malice afore-

496

proper
directs attention to
a reasonable doubt
his
Kane, 27 Cal.2(1 693, 699
v. Wilson, 100
Plywood
P.2d 587].)
[8] (b) That the discretion of
in considering the
effect of evidence as proof is not absolute and that it is their
duty to avoid fanciful theories and unreasonable inferences
and not to resort to imagination or suspicion.
This instruction was properly refused.
The court did instruct the jurors that it was their duty
to try the issues of fact
by the allegations in the
information and defendant's plea of not guilty; that they
should perform this duty uninfluenced by passion or prejudice
against defendant; that neither the fact that defendant had
been arrested nor the fact that an information had been filed
1
8eetion 288 of the Penal Code reads: ''Any person who shall wilfully
and lewdly con.mit any lewd or lasci'"ious act including any of the acts
constituting other crimes provided for in part one of this code upon or
with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the ag<J
of fourteen years, with the intent of
appealing to, or gratifying
the lust or passionB or sexual desires of
person or of such child.
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the State prison for
a term of from one year to life.''
•section 1096a of the Penal Code reads: "In charging a jury, the
court may read to the jury section 1096 of this code, and no further
instruction on the subject of the presumption of innocence or defining
reasonable doubt need he given.''
'Section 1096 of the Penal Code reads: ''A defendant in a criminal
action is presumed to be innorent until the contrary is proved, and in
case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is
entitled to an acquittal. but the effect of hi& presumption is only to
place upon the state the burden of
hirr. guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is
as follows: 'It is not a mere
possible <ioubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and de·
pending -;,n moral
is open
or imaginary doubt.
It is that state of the
which, after
entire comparison and
consideration of all the
leaves the minds of jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, of the truth of the charge.' "
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were not
of such facts that

before the
; and that they
from any or an
to be guilty
were told that
must be govintrodnced in the trial and the law
forbade them to be
passion.

instruction»
defendant is not in a
to complain.
(People V.
46 CaL2d 141. 150 [13] r292 P.2d 897].)
[9] Fourth : The evidence is
as a matter of law
to sustain a conviction
m1trder in the first degree.
It is clear from the record that the prosecution for first
degree murder was
on the
that defendant's
act was an unlawful
of a human
with malice
aforethought committed in the perpt>tration or attempted
perpetration of a violation of section 288 of the Penal Code
This was expressly stated by the district attorney in his opening statement when he told the jury: "It is the theory of thf'
People that this defendant killed in the course of committing
a child molestation."
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding of an unlawful killing of a human
with malicf' aforethought, which
establishe::: the crime of murder.
there is a total
absence of evidence that defendant violated or attempted to
violate section 288 of the Penal Code.
The record
shows that defrndant asked decedent
prior to the time of killing her whether she was a virgin and
that when her dead
was found. the apron she was wearing came down below her
parts. but that the skirt sh"'
was wearing was
above them.
The testimony of the autopsy surgeor- disclosed no evidence
of contusion or laceration on the
parts of decedent's
body, and a
disclosed no spermatozoa.
The foregoing eviilenre does not support a finding that defendant had either
or attempted to commit an act
in violation of the
of section 28fl of the Penal Code
Hence, the murder in this case was murder of the second
degree.
The judgment of the trial court of murder of the first degree
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is modified and the cause remanded to the trial court with
directions to enter
defendant finding him
guilty of murder in the second
and thereupon to pronounce judgment upon him as
by law.

c.

and Schauer,

concurred.

J.-I dissent.
While the evidence
to show that defendant killed
Elvira in the course
or
to commit an
act with her
section 288 of the Penal Code i~
much stronger than the evidence relied upon by the prosecution in the recent case of People v. Craig, ante, p. 313 [316
P.2d 9471, as showing that the killing there was in the course
of committing or attempting to commit rape, and the author
of the majority opinion here
with two of his associates
in a dissenting
in that case, f am nevertheless of the
opinion that there is insufTicient evidence in the case at bar
to show that the killing here was in the course of committing or
attempting to commit an act prohibited by section 288 of the
Penal Code.
I do not, however, agree with the conclusion reached by the
majority that the evidence fails to establish the crime of
murder of the first degree or that the prosecution relies solely
upon the contention that the verdict of murder of the first
degree can be sustained solely on the theory that defendant
killed Elvira in the course of committing or attempting to
commit an act with her prohibited by section 288 of the Penal
Code. In this connection I will quote the following excerpt
from the brief of the attorney general : "While the Court
instructed the jury that murder which is committed in the
perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any act punishable
under Penal Code Section 288 is murder of the first degree,
the Court also instructed that murder perpetrated by any kind
of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder of
the first degree .... We submit that there are circumstances
reasonably supporting a finding that the killing was wilful,
deliberate and premeditated. The machete . . . is a heavy
instrument. The fact that it was found near the body and
appeared to be in a bloody condition, and the fact that there
were wounds on the body which could have been inflicted by
such an instrument,
the conclusion that it was wielded
by appellant. . . . There was evidence that it was about the
premises prior to Elvira's death .... The autopsy testimony
disclosed that the body of the deceased was brutally hacked.
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'!'he
Raul away
evidence includes
threat
made
prior to the
and
Elvira and the other m_embers of the
Vve submit that
Stroble, 36 CaL2d
619-620
'' '
each in
manner
inflict
not merely
injury or random mutilation. 'rhere 1s evidence apart frow
defendant's confessions that before the child's death the im
plements were at various
about the
An inference can be drawn that the killer who collected and used the
implements had determined that he wished to bring about
death and carried out that determinatwn. This, in the lighr
of the other drcumstances including the charges against
defendant whieh were then pending, is a sufficient prima facie
showing of delit;eration and premeditation.'
'' _E'or the foregoing reasons, we submit that the verdict
of the jury in the case at bar was a proper one."
The foregoing recitation of faets is m accordance with the
record in this ease, and in my opinion fully supports the
verdict of murder of the first degree.
It also appears that the trial conrt correctly instructed
the jury on the issues of premeditation and deliberation and
there can be little doubt that the verdict of first degree
murder was based upon a determination that the murder was
the result of a wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing.
I do not agree with the holding of the majority that the
testimony of Elvira's mother relative to a threat made by the
defendant in September, 1953 to kill her and her two children
was admissible as constituting an accusatory statement as
such testimony has none of the characteristics of an accusatory
statement (People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699 [172 P.2d 18]).
Such testimony was, however, admissible for the purpose of
showing threats made by defendant toward decedent and his
state of mind and motive which abundantly supports the
determination by the
that the mmder was the result of a
wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing.
For the foregoing reasons I would affirm the judgment.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
The prosecution has contended throughout the trial and
appeal that the brutal murder of the 13-year-old girl consti-
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killing";
in the ~n·~n,,+~o+;:n~
or attempt tc
an "act
punishable under section 288.
Code. 189.) The trial
court gave instructions
both theories, and. in my ,...,...,.,,,""
there was
evidence
conviction upon both
With respect to
it is
established
that the "lewd and
of the Penal Code
\'iolence or
mere touching or
child with the
CaLApp.2d 276
P 2d 6941 ;
v. Lett. 69 Cal.App.2d
665 [160 P.2d 112]; People v. Lanham. 137 CaLApp. 737 ra1
P.2d 410]; People v
37
778 [ 174 P 9161:
630 f144 P 975]; see also
People v. Dabner, 25
People v. Batsford, 91 Cai.App.2d 607 :205 P 2d 731] ; People
v. Hartshorn, 59 CaLApp.2d 285 [138 P.2d 7821: People v
Bronson, 69 Cal.App. 83 [230 P 213 J i It is further signifi
cant that murder committed either in the perpetration of, or
in the attempt to perpetrate, any act proscribed by section 288
constitutes murder of the first
In my opinion, it may be reasonably inferred from all the
evidence that defendant's acts immediately preceding the
killing were sex motivated, and that the murder was committed when the girl
defendant's attempts to commit
lewd acts "with the intent of
appealing to, or
gratifying [his] lust or
or sexual desires." (Pen
Code, § 288.) It is therefore wholly immaterial that no rapt>
had actually been committed or, as stated iu the majority
opinion, that ''The testimony of the autopsy surgeon dis.
closed no evidence of contusion or laeeration on the privatf
parts of decedent's body, and a microscopic examination disclosed no spermatozoa."
As I am convinced from my review of the entire record
that there was ample evidence to sustain the conviction of
first degree murder, and that there wa>< no prejudicial error,
I would affirm the judgment and the order denying a new
trial.
Shenk, J., concurred.

